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PUBLIC BENEFITS AND FEDERAL
AUTHORIZATION FOR ALIENAGE
DISCRIMINATION BY THE STATES
H0 V104.RD F Cl-L4NC '-''

vVhen Congress enacted sweeping new restrictions on alien ac
cess to public benefits in

1 996, it not only imposed such restrictions

directly on various federal programs but also authorized the states
to restrict alien access to state benefits and to certain designated
federal benefits, including Medicaid and welfare.1

The

1 996 wel

fare legislation also prohibits states from providing "any State or
local public benefit" to unauthorized immigrants unless the state
subsequently enacts a law that "affirmatively provides for such eligi
bility.""' These provisions authorize the states to decide whether the
aliens in question should have access to public benefits.
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied a lenient standard of re
view to federal laws that discriminate against aliens.:-> In i\!Iathews v.
Diaz, the Court held that Congress could restrict alien access to fed
eral medical insurance.4

This deferential review of federal laws,

however, contrasts sharply with the strict scrutiny that the Court has
applied to state laws that discriminate against aliens in the distribu
tion of public benefits."

In Graham v. Richardson, the Court held

that states violated the U.S. Constitution by discriminating against
aliens in the distribution of welfare benefits.'' The Graham Court
''' Professor of Law, U niversity of Pennsylvania Law School . I would l i ke to
thank Evan Caminker, Daniel Halberstam, Roderick Hills, .Jr., Robert Howse,
Richard Primus, Peter Spiro, M ichael Wishnie, symposium participants at the New
York University School of Law, and workshop participants at the U niversity of
Michigan Law School for helpful comments.
1 . See Personal Responsibil i ty and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1 996, Pub. L. No. 1 04-193 , SS 402 (b) , 4 1 2 , 1 1 0 Stat. 2 1 05 , 2264-65, 2269-70 ( cocli
fiecl at R U.S.C. 8 1 6 1 2 ( b ) , 1622 (Supp. I I 1994 ) ).
2. See id. S 4 1 1 , 1 10 Stat. at 2268-69 ( codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1 62 1 (Supp. I I
1994) ) .
3 . .JoHN E . NowAK & RoNALD D . RoTuND.\, CoNSTITUTION.\L LAw s 1 4. 1 2, at
792 ( 6th ed. 2000) ("[A] lienage classifications created by federal law will be sub
jected to only the rational basis standard of review. ").
4. 426 U.S. 67 ( 1 976) .
5. Now.\K & RoTUNDA, supra n o te 3, at 79 1 ( "[W]hen state . . . laws classify
persons on the basis of United States ci tizenship for the purpose of distributing
economic benefits . . . , the law will be subjected to strict j uclicial scrutiny. " ) .
6. 403 U.S. 365 ( 1 97 1 ) .
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offered two alternative rationales for its holding, striking down the
laws in question not only as discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause but also as state laws preempted by federal poli
cies.7

The question posed by the

1996 welfare legislation under

these precedents is whether state discrimination against aliens in
the distribution of public benefits should still be subject to strict
scrutiny when this discrimination is explicitly authorized by Con
gress. Some commentators have argued in favor of strict scrutiny,
based on the theory that Congress cannot devolve its power to dis
criminate against aliens to the states."

In Aliessa v. Novello, the

Court of Appeals of New York recently agreed, applying strict scru
tiny and striking down a New York law discriminating against aliens
in the distribution of Medicaid benefits despite federal authoriza
tion for such discriminationY
In this essay, I offer a skeptical view of the "nondevolvability
principle," which would apply strict scrutiny to restrictions imposed
by the states on alien access to public benefits even when such re
strictions are explicitly authorized by Congress.10 My analysis of this
claim takes the holdings in Graham and Diaz as given. Within those
constraints, I raise some questions regarding the policy rationales
commonly advanced in favor of a rule of nondevolvability.
Nondevolvability would prevent the federal government from
authorizing discrimination by the states under circumstances in
which the U.S. Constitution would prevent the states from discrimi
nating under their own authority. Why should we, as a policy mat
ter, want to prevent the federal government from authorizing states
to discriminate against aliens in the allocation of public benefits?
The Graham Court declared that "Congress does not have the
power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protec
tion Clause."''

We may regard this declaration as dictum, given

that the Graham Court held that Congress had not authorized the
discrimination at issue in that case.12 In any event, this declaration
begs the question: why should we think that the states are still violat
ing the Equal Protection Clause when they act with federal authori7. !d. at 370-80.
8. See, e.g., Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional A1Togation of Power: Alien Con
stellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U . L. REv. 591 ( 1994) ; M i chael J.
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigot1y? Devolution of the Immigration Powe1� Equal Protection,
and Federalism, 76 N.Y. U . L. RE\'. 493 ( 2001) .
9. 754 N . E.2d 1085, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2001 ) .
10. Wish n i e , supra n ote 8, at 558.
11. 403 U .S. at 382 .
1 2. See id. at 380-83.
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In Diaz, afte.- all, the Court indicated that the federal

government itself has broad powers to discriminate against aliens. 1·1

The Diaz Court placed the "responsibility for regulating the re
lationship between the United States and our alien visitors" with
"the political branches of the Federal Government."1'-,

Because

"these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers,"
they are "more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Execu
tive than to the Judiciary." IG If these considerations allow the fed
eral

government

to

invoke

objectives

sufficient

to

overcome

equality-based o�jections and thus justify discrimination against
aliens, then perhaps Congress should be able to invoke the same
goals on behalf of its authorization for states to discriminate, as sug
gested by William Cohen.17 If the result in Diaz flows from judicial
deference to the decisions of the political branches on matters deal
ing with foreigners, then why should courts interfere with the deci
sion by Congress that it vvould serve federal objectives to allow states
to

discriminate

in

the

ways

authorized

by

the

1 996 welfare

legislation?
I.
UNIFORt\1I1Y A ND THE RJGHT TO
INTERSTATE TRAVEL
The Graham Court suggested that the problem with such an
authorization is that it would allow for divergent state policies, con
trary to the requirement of "an uniform Rule of Naturalization" in
13. There are other c ontexts in which Congress may authorize state laws that
would be unconstitutional i n the absence of such auth orization. See, e.g., North
east Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U . S. 1 59 , 1 74 (1985) ( " When Congress
so chooses, state acti ons which it plainly authorizes are i nvulnerable to constitu
ti onal attack under the Commerce Clause . " ) ; Wishnie , sujJra note 8, at 539-41 ( d is
cussing foreign affairs); id. at 546-47 ( discussing the regulation of foreign
commerce); id. at 5 6 1 ( d iscussing Native American j urisprudence under the Equal
Protection Clause).
14. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U .S. 67, 8 1 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . These p owers distinguish restric
tions on alien access to public benefits from the California welfare law s tntck clown
by the Court i n Saenz v. Roe, 526 U .S . 489 ( 1 99 9 ) . The Saenz Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment prevented e i ther the federal government or a state gov
ernment from enacting the residency requirement at issue in that case. !d. at
507-08.
1 5 . Diaz, 426 U.S. at 8 1 .
16. !d.
1 7. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State raws:/\
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387, 420-21 ( 1 983) .
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the U.S. Constitution.1" The Court of Appeals of New York recently
adopted this same reasoning in Aliessa.1�) The federal power to reg
ulate immigration and the relationship between the United States
and foreigners, however, does not derive from the Naturalization
Clause alone.�0 Thus, even if we agree that we need uniformitv in
rules of naturalization, it does not follow that uniformity is required
in other matters pertaining to aliens. In particular, it does not fol
low that rules regarding alien access to public benefits or even im
migration matters must also be uniform across different states.
In fact, immigration consequences frequently turn on diver
gent state laws. A few examples are sufficient to illustrate the point.
For a marriage to serve as the basis for an immigration visa, for
example, the marriage must be valid under state law.�1

vVe find

other examples in the inadmissibility or deportability grounds
based on convictions for crimes involving "moral turpitude."��
First, immigration consequences may turn on the maximum sen
tence that may be imposed for the crime.�:� Thus, aliens convicted
for the same crime of mor<d turpitude may face different immigra
tion consequences because the states in which they committed the
crimes may impose diflerent maximum sentences for such crimes.
Second, for a conviction to be for a crime of "moral turpitude" and
thus be a basis for inadmissibility or deportability, the nature of the
crime, as defined by the statute, must involve moral turpitude.�-+
Thus, aliens that commit the same act in different states may f�Ke
different immigration consequences because the states in which
they commit the crime may convict them under laws that define the
crime differently. In effect, our immigration laws delegate some
authority to the states to determine which crimes trigger deporta
tion or exclusion from the United States.
18. U .S. CoNsr. art. I,§ 8, cl. 4; sN' Graham v. Richardson, 403 U .S. 365 , 382
( 197 1 ) . Others have also i nvoked this clause in arguing that the U .S. Constitution
prevents Congress from authorizing states to adopt divergent rules on alien eligi
bili ty for public benefits. See Carrasco, supra note 8 , at 631 -38; Wishnie, supra note
8, at 566.
1 9. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N. E.2d 1 085, 1 098 ( N .Y. 2001 ) .
20. Sel' Wishnie, supra note 8 , at 532 (identifying various sources of the immi
gration power, including the Natw-alization Clause, the Foreign Affairs Clauses,
and the Foreign Commerce Clause) .
21. See, e.g., United States
400 U.S. 903 ( 1 970) .

v.

Sacco, 428 F. 2d 264, 270 (9th Cir. 1970) , wt.

denial,

22. SeeR U .S . C.A. s§ l l82 ( a ) ( 2 ) (A) ( i ) ( I ) , 1 22 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) (A) ( i ) (II ) ( West 1994 ) .
23. See id. �8 1 lR2 ( a ) ( 2 ) (A) ( i i ) ( I I ) , 1 22 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) (A) ( i ) ( II) .
24. See, e.g., Goldeshtein

\.

INS, 8 F.�d 645, 648-49 ( 9 th Cir. 199 3 ) .
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Our immigration policies may apply to aliens differently de
pending upon the state in which they married or in which they
committed a crime. Thus, there is nothing unusual about Congress
deciding that, as a matter of federal immigration policy, we should
allow the states to determine some specified aspects of that policy.
The states are not entrusted with immigration policy in the absence
of such federal invitation. Even with federal authorization, as when
states decide which crimes to punish severely enough to trigger de
portation, states may make their divergent decisions without immi
gration

consequences

in

mind.

Nevertheless,

we

leave

it

to

Congress to decide whether this state role and the discretion it al
lows for the adoption of divergent policies serves federal policies
regarding the treatment of aliens.
Furthermore, even before 1996, states could adopt divergent
policies regarding unauthorized immigrants. In De Canas v. Bica,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a California law that prohibited the
employment of unauthorized immigrants.�" Rejecting a claim that
this law was preempted under federal law, the Court reasoned that
although the federal government had enacted no such prohibition,
this state law was consistent with federal policy regarding these im
migrants.:oi6 Similarly, states could adopt divergent policies regard
ing the eligibility of unauthorized immigrants for state programs
for the needy.27
These observations raise the question: what is so important
about a policy of uniformity regarding alien access to public bene
fits? The Graham Court suggested an answer to this question. The
Court suggested that variation among the states on this question
would interfere with the right of indigent aliens to move across
state borders and to choose to live in another state. An indigent
alien unable to work would be unable to live where he or she could
not "secure the necessities of life" because of denial of public
assistance. 2<'
The problem with the Graham rationale, however, is that it
proves too much.

A state could impose precisely the same eco

nomic burden on the alien by failing to provide this public assis
tance to citizens and aliens alike. Suppose a state chooses to have
no state welfare program at all.

Unless the Court is prepared to

declare that the U.S. Constitution requires all states to enact welfare
25.
26.
27.
p rovide
28.

424 u.s. 351 ( 1 976) .
See id. at 361-62.
In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 ( 1 982) , the Court did not comp e l states to
such access outside the context of public education .
Graham v. Richardson , 403 U . S. 365, 380 ( 1971) .
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programs, it cannot ensure that an indigent alien actually enjoys
"the right . . . to live where he chooses" as imagined in Craham.'2'J
Indeed, the indigent alien could not enjoy the right suggested in
Graham unless we require all states not only to provide public assis
tance but also to do so using precisely the same eligibility criteria.
Otherwise, there will be some indigent aliens unable to move into
states that impose more stringent eligibilit-y criteria.

If we do not

consider it unconstitutional for states to adopt divergent welfare
policies in general, then why should we regard it as problematic if
they adopt divergent welfare policies regarding aliens in particular?
II.
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES AND THE
INTERESTS OF ALIENS
The Graham rationale calls for uniform welfare policies among
the states, but the Graham holding calls for uniform treatment of
citizens and aliens in state welfare programs. These are two differ
ent l)'pes of uniformity, and there is no necessary logical connec
tion between the two.

The poor fit between the policy rationale

and the holding indicates that a different policy concern actually
animates the Court's holding."'0

A rule barring discrimination

against aliens is more plausibly explained as an expression of the
"antidiscrimination

and anticaste principles"

cited

Wishnie in support of a rule of nondevolvability."'1

by

Michael

If we seek to

derive an antidiscrimination rationale for nondevolvabilit:y from
Graham, however, we run into two problems posed by the Court's
subsequent decision in Diaz.
The first problem is a matter of logic. If Diaz qualifies the an
tidiscrimination principle such that discrimination by the federal
government deserves deference from the courts, then why not ex
tend this deference when the federal government has expressly au
thorized the discrimination in question?

It would seem that the

29. ld. at 379.
30. Perhaps perceivin g such p roblems with the righ t to travel as described in
Graham, 403 L! .S. at 380, the Court in Saenz v . Roe recast the "right to travel " at
stake i n state laws regardi ng welfare benefits as "the right of the n ewly arrived
citizen to the same p rivileges and i m mu n ities enjoyed by other c i ti zens of the same
State." 526 U . S. 489, 502 (1999 ) . The Saenz Court stntck down Cal ifornia's dis
crimi nation against newly a rrived citizens i n that case, relyin g on the p rivileges and
immun ities c lauses of the U . S. Constitution. ld. at 501 , 503 (citi n g L!.S. CoNST. art.
IV, § 2; L! . S . CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1) . Aliens, however, can not i nvoke the t-ight
described in Saenz, because those clauses protect only the privileges and immu n i
ties of citizens. See NowAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 3, at 988.
3 1. Wishnie, supm note 8, at 553.
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same policies that support deference in Diaz. would apply to dis
crimination by a state that occurs with the explicit prior <tppnwal of

Congress.
The second problem is a matter of consequences.

Does a rule

of nondevolvability actually serve the antidiscrimination principle?
vVhat would be the consequences of a constitutional rule applying
strict scrutiny despite federal authorization for states to discrimi
nate against aliens in public entitlement programs? As long as Diaz
gives the federal government a free hand in cliscrirninating against
aliens, there is no presumption that a rule of nondevolvability
would serve antidiscrimination or anticaste principles. As the Gra

ham Court suggested, a nondevolvability rule would promote uni
formity in welfare policies regarding alien access nationwide.

As

already discussed, however, the link between nationwide uniformity
and the antidiscrimination principle is questionable.

Thus, if an

tidiscrimination is the real concern here, then the policy rationale
is still insufficient to justiry a constitutional rule of nondevolvability.
In any case in which the federal government authorizes states
to adopt divergent policies regarding alien access to public benefits,
we can presume that there exists some political support for exclud
ing aliens from these programs and some political support for in
cluding aliens. Peter Spiro has suggested that "state-level authority
will allow those states harboring intense anti-alien sentiment to act
on those sentiments at the state level, thus diminishing any interest
on their part to seek national legislation to similarly restrictionist
ends."'��

Whether or not this "steam-valve federalism" story out

lined by Spiro is likely to describe reality,:>,:\ it should be apparent
that a constitutional rule applying strict scrutiny to divergent state
policies despite federal authorization would have uncertain conse
quences.

Given this constitutional constraint, the federal govern

ment may sometimes respond with a uniform rule granting alien
access, but it may sometimes respond with a uniform rule barring
alien access. That is, if we insist on nondevolvability, then we may
well get uniform discrimination as a result.

What reason do we

have for thinking that a rule of nondevolvability will lead to uni
form access rather than uniform exclusion?
Rather than creating "laboratories of bigotry against immi
grants," to use Wishnie's phrase,M we might just as plausibly view
:12. PeterJ. Spiro, LNnning lo Live with lmmignilion Fednalism, 29 Coi'iN. L. RE\".
1627, 1627 ( 1997).
33. !d. at 1630. 'vVishni e challenges Spiro's claim as a matter of histury. See
Wishnie, s11jna n ote 8, at 555-58.
34. Wishni e, sufJm note 8, at 553.
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fecle1·al authorization of divergent state policies as creating labora
tories of generosity toward immigrants.

If we had bound Congress

with a constitutional constraint of uniformity in the political atmos
phere of 1996, then Congress might have excluded immigrants
from Medicaid or \Velfare rather than leaving the question of immi
grant access up to the states. If required to impose a uniform rule
nationwide with respect to unauthorized immigrants,

Congress

might well have barred access to state programs for such immi
grants nationwide without providing states the option of granting
access through subsequent legislation.
Thus, those who seek to promote the interests of immigrants
have no principled basis for promoting a rule of nondevolvability.
It might serve the interests of immigrants excluded by particular
state laws adopted pursuant to the 1996 welfare legislation to have
these laws struck down now, but the constitutional rule we establish
in doing so may come back to haunt us later. A constitutional rule
of nondevolvability like that adopted by the Aliessa court would not
be result-oriented: it would not distinguish between instances in
which immigration politics would favor uniform inclusion of immi
grants and instances that favor uniform exclusion.

\Ale would be

stuck with a rule of nondevolvability even when it backfires and cuts
against the interests of immigrants.
Perhaps the connection between a rule of nondevolvability and
the antidiscrimination principle exists not as a matter of principle
but as a matter of empirical prediction. Critics of devolution feared
that states authorized to exclude immigrants from their welfare pro
grams would seek to encourage indigent aliens to move to other
states by restricting their access to public benefits, leading to a "race
to the bottom" that would precipitate widespread discrimination
against aliens. I do not seek here to answer the question of whether
we should expect such a race to the bottom."''' We should note,
however, that the answer to this question does not necessarily have
the implications commonly supposed for a rule of nondevolv
ability/·6
Suppose it were established that states engage in a race to the
bottom when authorized to discriminate against aliens in welfare
programs, as many predicted would be the result of the 1996 wei35. Spiro argues that the risk of such a race is small. See Spiro , sujna n ote 32,
at 1639-46. States have i n fact been reluctant to use the invitation in the 1996
welfare legislation to restrict alien access to public benefits. See Wishn ie, sujJra
note 8 , at 515-18.
36. Spiro suggests that a " race to the bottom . . . would militate strongly
against devolvin g such authorities i n the first place . " Spiro, sujJra n ote 32, at 1639.

�

i.

I

�OU�J

,-\LIENAGE DISCRI\'IINATION BY THE STATES

%5

fare legislation. Once thi:1 phenomenon has become apparent, we
would expect Congress to anticipate this when it contemplates legis
lation authorizing states ro discriminate against aliens in such pro
grams.

Indeed, given widespread predictions of such a race to the

bottom, we might infer that Congress expected this when it acted in

1996. If Congress anticipates widespread discrimination as a result

of its legislation, then we can infer that Congress would have ap
proved of these expected consequences.

Therefore, any Congress

voting to authorize discrimination by the states would be a Con
gress inclined to exclude aliens from many public benefits. Given
such a Congress, a constitutional nde of nondevolvability would be
likely to result in a federal rule excluding aliens from the public

benefits in question nationwide. Thus, if federal authorization for
discrimination by the states is understood to allow a race to the bot
tom, then a rule inhibiting or blocking such authorization will cut
against the interests of immigrants and in favor of broader discrimi
rntion against them through uniform federal legislation.
On the other hand, if Congress expects very little discr imina
tion to result from such authorization. then we can infer that a Con
gress voting in bvor of authorization under these circumstances
would be inclined to include aliens in the programs in question. A
constitutional rule discouraging authorization for divergent state
policies in such cases would be likely to cut in favor of immigrants
because such a Congress would probably vote to include aliens in
the programs nationwide.

In either case, a constitutional rule of

nondevolvability would tend to have a limited effect, whether
against or in favor of the interests of immigrants, because we can
assume that Congress would adopt the rule (whether excluding or
including aliens) that most closely approximates the consequences
expected to flow from federal authorization for divergent state
policies.
In any event, it would be a coincidence if a constitutional rule
of nondevolvability were to cut in favor of equal treatment for
aliens on average, because there is no connection in principle be
tween such a rule and antidiscrimination principles. There may be
many proposed rules that might reduce discrimination against
aliens as an incidental matter, but this speculative effect would not
provide a convincing reason to adopt such rules. We have reason to
applaud a constitutional rule of nondevolvability as a matter of
principle only if we actually value uniformity itself, not if we value
antidiscrimination or anticaste principles, and not if we are moti
vated by a concern for the welb.re of immigrants. Uniformity and
nondevolvability per se strike no blow for any of those causes. The
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only way to ensure that we uphold the antidiscrimination principle
in the context of public benefits is to overt u rn Diaz itself.'" 7 As long
as we take Diaz seriously, however, antidiscrimination principles
provide no sound rationale for a constitutional rule of nondevolv
ability.
III.
NONDELEGATION CON CERNS
Gilbert Paul Carrasco has also suggested that federal authoriza
tion for the states to discriminate against aliens in the distribution
of federal benefits represents a delegation by Congress of a non
delegable legislative power.3s Noting th at the nondelegation doc
trine has "fallen into desuetude, "'�� he nevertheless urges a revival
of the doctrine. In particular, he claims that federal authorization
for discrimination by the states impermissibly delegates the power
vested exclusively in Congress by the N aturalization Clause:10
This claim is questionable on a number of grounds. First, the
Naturalization Clause is not the sole source of federal power to dis
criminate against aliens in public benefits. 1 1 Second, the federal
government is not delegating an exclusively federal power when it
authorizes the states to discriminate against aliens. After all, even
without

federal

authorization,

states

may

discrim i n ate

against

aliens, subject to j udicial review under a rational basis test in som e
contexts, but subject to strict judicial scrutiny i n other contexts, in
cluding public benefits. 4::2 Thus, even under Graham, the states en
joy some power to discriminate against aliens, even with respect to
public benefits. That is, the states and the federal government have
concurrent powers to discriminate against aliens in public benefits,
albeit with stricter j udicial scrutiny normally applied to the states,
such that the states bear a heavier burden in justifying such
discrimination.
37. Even overruling Diaz would not necessarily serve the interest� of aliens.
To the extent that the courts make it difficult for Congress and the states to ex
clude immigrants from public benefits, Congress may respond by i m p osing more
severe restrictions on the immigration of indigent aliens , excluding aliens who
would have been better off i f allowed to immigrate subject to the condi ti on that
they not accep t the public benefits in question. Application of the antidiscri m i na
tion princip l e to p ublic benefits alone wil l have uncertain effects on the welt�tre of
aliens as long as Congress retains i ts plenary power over im migration policies.
38. See Carrasco, supm note 8, at 626-3 1 .
39. Id. at 629.
40. Id. at 630-3 1 .
4 1 . See Wishnie, supra note 8, at 532.
42. See NovvAK & RoTU NDA, supra note 3 , at 79 1 -92.

i
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Viewed in this l ight, the issue is not really whether Congress
may delegate or devolve the federal power to regulate relations with
aliens, but rather whether federal authorization granted in the ex
ercise of that plenary power shou ld affect the degree of scru tiny
that courts apply to a state exercis ing its own concurrent power to
discriminate against aliens . Given the degree of judicial deference
accorded to the decisions made by the political branches of the fed
eral government on these m atters, it seems logical that authoriza
tion by these branches should imply similar deference for state l aws
enacted with prior federal approval.
The U . S. Supreme Court in Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation
applied such deferential review to a state l aw pertaining to N ative
Americans that had been authorized by federal statute but chal
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause.4� Noting that the state
'\vas legislating under explicit authority granted by Congress,"
which authorized the state law " in the exercise of its plenary power
over I ndian affairs , " the Court subjected the state l aw to the same
rationality revievv that would have been applied to federa l legisla
tion "singling out tribal I ndians, legislation that might otherwise be
constitution ally offensive , " rather than the stricter scrutiny usually
applied to state laws on the s ubject.44 Given the obvious analogy to
the federal government ' s plenary power over relations with aliens,
lower New York courts cited Yakima Indian Nation to uphold state
restrictions on alien access to public benefits authorized by the

1996 welfare legislation before the Court of Appeals of New York
reversed in A liessa.45 The Court of Appeals of New York reversed,
however, without discussing Yakima Indian Nation . 46
43. 439 U . S . 463, 500-0 1 ( 1 979) .
44. !d. at 501 .
45. See Alvarino v. Wing, 690 N .Y.S . 2 d 262, 263 ( N .Y. App. Div. 1 999 ) ; Al iessa
v. Novello, 7 1 2 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98-99 ( N .Y. App. Div. 2000 ) , rev 'd, 754 N . E . 2cl 1 085
(200 l ) . The U .S. Supreme Court has described tribal classifications as "political
rathe r than racial i n nature," based o n membershi p in " quasi-sovereign tribal e n ti
ties." Morton v. Mancari, 4 1 7 U . S . 535, 5 5 3 n.24, 554 ( 1 974) . Tribal classifications
are thus similar to alienage classifications, which are also "political" insofar as
aliens are normally members of a foreign sovereign e n tity. Wishnie tries to distin
guish Yakima Indian Nation by arguing that alienage classifications are m o re " ra
cial " than tribal classifications, citing the analogy drawn by the Graham court
b e tween alienage and racial classifi cations. See Wishnie, sujJra n o te 8, at 564-65
( c i ti n g Graham v. Richardson , 403 U . S. 365, 372 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ) . Tribal classifications,
however, l ike racial classifications, may be based o n prej udice or antipathy, and
cann o t be distinguished from alienage classifications on this basis.
46. Despite cases applyi ng rational i ty review to uphold statutes over the obj e c
tio n of Native Americans, Wishn i e argues that rational i ty review is o n ly appropriate
for l egislation that brnefits Native Americans. See vVish nie, sujna. n o te 8, a t 562 &
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Even if the nondelegation doctrine itself is inapplicable t o the

1 996 welhue legislation, the policy conce rns cited in support of the
nonclelegation doctrine may also support a rule inhibiting federal
authorization for states to discriminate against aliens. Carrasco, for
example, suggests that " forcing the el ected representatives of Con
gress to make the most difficult policy choices" is a reason to revive
the nondelegation doctrine.

fi

The desire to make Congress more

politically accountable and to prevent it from evading responsibility
for policy choices, however, i s quite general.

Unless courts are pre

pared to apply the nonclelegation doctrine broadly in other con
texts, those who invoke nonclelegation concerns bear the burden of
explaining why these concerns are especially acute when Congress
authorizes the states to restrict alien access to public benefits.
Once we seek a more specific reason to apply a rule of
nondevolvability in this particular context, we run into many of the
same problems that we encountered with the other proposed policy
rationales for such a rule. For example, if the concern is that states
will engage in a race to the bottom as they seek to encourage the
indigent to reside in other states, then the argument seems to prove
too much. This concern is not limited to the question of ali en ac
cess to public benefits. One might expect such a race in any in
stance in which states are authorized to choose divergent welfare
policies, whether the indigent are aliens or citi zens. ·H' If the claim i s
that questions regarding aliens i n particular s hould be resolved na
tionwide by the federal government, we must explain why vve have
long allowed states to adopt divergent policies regarding unautho
rized immigrants, including their access to public benefits.
n.352. But SPe Duro v. Reina, 495 U .S. 676, 692 ( 1 990) ( noting " the Federal Gov
ernme nt's broad auth ori ty to legislate with respect to e nrolled I ndians as a class,
whether to impose burdens or benefits " ) . vVish n i e argues that these cases do n o t
suggest that " rationality review i s appropriate for federally auth o rized state welfare
laws that discriminate against i m migran ts. " \1Vishnie, sujna n o te 8, at 562. Even if
the effect of federal authorizati on were constrained as \Nish n i e suggests, however,
Congress could easily avoid this constra i n t by requi ring the exclusion of aliens
from public ben efits i n the absence of state legislation to the con trary. This de
fau l t rule would imply that all state welfare laws would bnrrjlt aliens compared to
the federally specified alternative of excl usio n . I t is hard to see what we would
accomplish by requiring Congress to specit)' a cliscri m i nato n· d e fau lt rule i n any
legislation authorizing divergen t state policies regarding ali e n access to public ben
efits. If anything, req uiring this fo rmal i ty would seem to i nc rease the l ikeli hood
that states will adopt discrimina ti o n agai nst aliens by debult. Such an effec t hardly
serves the antidiscri m ination p ri nciples that Wish nie stresses.
47. Carrasco, supra n o te 8, at 628.
48. See Note, De-uolving 'vl'elfarP Progmrns to the Stales: A Fu/J!ir Choice Prnpative,
1 09 HAR\'. L. RE\". 1 984, 1 985 ( 1 996) .
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ALIENAGE D IS C R I �J I NAT I O N BY THE STATES

If the claim is that the states are more susceptible to xenopho
bic passions than the federal govern ment, then the concern would
appear to be the pro tecti o n of aliens from disc rimination, and the
q uestion again becomes whether a rule of no ndevolvability would
serve that objective. Even if it were clear that states are m ore in
clined as a general m atter to discriminate against aliens than the
federal government is, we c a n presun1 e that a Congress au thorizing
the states to discrim inate would understand the consequences ex
pec ted to flow from its authorization, and we c an thus infer that
such a Congress is itself inclined to discriminate against aliens.
Therefore, a rule that would frustrate authorization for divergent
state policies m ay well lead such a Congress to exclude aliens from
welfare programs nationwide.
For example, to the extent that we generally expec t foreign
policy concerns to inhibit the federal government from discriminat
i ng against aliens, we would expect these pressures to apply also to
the federal government' s decision to authorize discrimination by
the states or to repeal such an authorization.

Therefore, a Con

gress that nevertheless authorizes discrimination by the states is
likely to be a Congress that would otherwise choose discrimination
itself . By the same token , a Congress that refuses to repeal an au
thorization to discriminate is likely to be a Congress that would re
fuse to repeal any discriminatory rule that it had itself imposed. A
rule of nondevolvability only ensures that the federal response is
uniform, not that it will be kind to aliens.
vVe may accuse Congress of avoiding difficult policy choices
when it authorizes the states to make these choices instead, but we
might also consider this response to be an appropriate compromise
in the face of conflicting preferences. If Congress determines that
the resolution of these m atters need not be uniform nationwide,
then it may be desirable to allow different sides to prevail in differ
ent states. Uniformity entails costs insofar as it prevents states from
choosing policies tailored to local preferences.

Congress might

have thought it unfair to burden those states that have a dispropor
tionate share of indigent immigrants.

States, after all, have no

power to regulate immigration, and Graham forces them to provide
aliens access to public benefits on the same terms granted citizens.
If required to impose a uniform rule nationwide, Congress could
respond to these concerns with a nationwide rule of exclusion, im
posed even on those states that would prefer to be more generous.
But why should we prevent Congress from choosing the less restric
tive alternative of giving sta tes the option of generosity?

It is not

clear what we gain by foreclosing the possibility of a flexible com-
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p romise i n which states can choose different responses t o such is
s ues.

Thus, the rationale for a rule of nondevolvab i l ity remains

obsc ure. Even if we perceive some val ue to having Congress bear
the responsibility for such decisio ns alon e rather than sharin g this

responsibility ·with the states, we m ust we igh th i s b e n efit against the
c os ts of imposing a rigid un ifonTl rule nationwide.
TV.
CONCLUSION
A rule that is consistent with the defer e n c e given t o the politi
cal branches in Diaz wendel defer to those branches when they
choose to authorize divergent state policies. I f the policy rationale

fo r s u c h deferen ce is to give th e political bran c hes greater freedom
in the conduct of our r elations with foreigners, then this policy is
u n d ercut by applying strict scrutiny to th e state policies authorized
by those branches:L9 If the un derlying p u rpose of this freedom is to
enable the political branches of the federal gover nment to use the
treatment of aliens as a bargain ing chip in international negotia
tions, for example, then judicially imposed constraints only curtail
this freedom.''° For the federal government to n egotiate with for
eign governments on these m atters, it must retain control over
alien access to public benefits. For this purpose, it is sufficien t that
the federal gover n m e nt maintain the exclusive powers to authorize
discrimination by the states and to repeal that authorization .

As

long as this authorization is revocable, the federal govern ment ulti
mately retains control over our relations with aliens, whether it dis
criminates

against

aliens

directly

or

authorizes

the

states

to

discriminate . If the federal gover n ment is to maintain this control,
a rule of nondevolvability is u n n ecessary. Thus, giving effect to fed
eral authorization for the states to discriminate is m ore consistent
with a theory that reconciles Graham and Diaz in a coherent way.
49 . S!'e Mathews v. D iaz, 426 U .S. 67, 8 1 ( 1 976) ( "Any rule of constitutional
law that \vould i n h ib i t the flexi b i l i ty of the political branches o f govern m e n t to
respond to changing world conditi ons should be adopted o n ly with the greatest
cautio n . " ) .
5 0 . The U .S. Supreme Court has suggested that i f C o ngress o r the Presi d e n t
were t o i mpose a citizenship requirement for federal service, " i t would be j ustified
lw the national i n terest i n providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized,
or possibly even as p roviding the President with an expendable token for treaty
negotiati ng purposes. " Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 4 2 6 U . S. 88, 1 05 ( 1 976) . We
could say the same for authori zation by Congress and the Presiden t for states to
impose c i tizenship require m e n ts for public benefit� . which would a l s o create such
incentives or tokens with the prior blessi ng of the federal i n s ti tu tions with respon
sibility for foreign afL1irs.

